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The language of mental pain: feel
like, feel as if
Catherine Paulin
 
Introduction
1 The  International  Association  for  the  Study  of  Pain  [1994]  provided  the  following
definition of  pain:  “An unpleasant  sensory and emotional  experience associated with
actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.” The relation of
causation between an actual or potential tissue damage and the experience of pain does
not apply, at least in most cases, to mental pain. On the contrary, the inability, or at least
the difficulty, to communicate verbally about pain, applies to physical and even more so
to mental pain. On the one hand, mental suffering comes with having a mind and can be
conceptualized as a subcategory of state. Such is the case in the following utterance: “I
am a shrimp at the bottom of the sea” used to convey a state of profound depression. On
the other hand,  mental  pain can be conceptualized as a  subjective experience,  as  in
J. Frame [2009: 18]:
(1) I felt myself dropping as if a trap door had opened into darkness1
2 The  language  of  mental  pain  reveals  how difficult  it  is  to  verbalize  our  sensations,
emotions, feelings, subjective states. The difficulty does not necessarily lie in the fugacity
of sensations, emotions or feelings. For A. Damasio [1999: 42] “the term feeling should be
reserved for the private, mental experience of an emotion, while the term emotion should
be used to designate the collection of responses, many of which are publicly observable”
given that mental pain often is a lasting experience or a subjective state.  A. Damasio
[1994: 149-150] identifies varieties of feelings: the first variety is based on emotions such
as  happiness,  sadness,  anger,  fear,  etc.  and  engenders  state  responses.  The  subject
experiencer feels happy, sad, angry, fearful, etc. A second variety of feelings is based on
emotions that constitute variations of the first type:
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[…] euphoria and ecstasy are variations of happiness; melancholy and wistfulness
are variations  of  sadness;  panic  and shyness  are  variations of  fear.  This  second
variety of feelings is tuned by experience, when subtler shades of cognitive state
are  connected  to  subtler  variations  of  emotional body  state.  [Damasio
1994: 149-150]
3 In Damasio’s approach, these varieties of feelings of basic or more subtle emotions, are
universal. This paper will concentrate on feelings of mental pain – which I believe are
universal  –,  on the difficulty there is  to translate them into verbal  language,  on the
conceptual patterns and the idiosyncratic variations that are mobilized to communicate
the experience of mental pain. The non-conformity between what is felt and its verbal
representation leads us to examine the role of the irreal in expressing inner feelings. The
term irreal is here to be understood as R. Langacker [1991: 243] defines it: what is “other
than (known) reality”.  He further explains  that  “[T]he core of  known reality is  thus
surrounded by a much larger region of  unknown reality.  Included in this  region are
situations of at least two sorts: those whose reality C2 suspects or contemplates but does
not accept as having been established, and those of which he is entirely ignorant.” Hence
the idea that the irreal enables the subject to conceptualize inner states of experience or
feelings, which are real for him, whose existence is not fully established for anyone else
and which are difficult to put into words. Mental pain is other than fully apprehended
known  reality.  The  conceptualizer  has  undergone  an  experience  which  can  only  be
represented approximately in figurative language.  The very reality of  mental  pain is
apprehended  by  what  it  is  not.  C. Lascaratou  [2007: 18]  explains  that  pain  is  two-
dimensional: internal and invisible, external and behavioral: “Most importantly, people
also claim their pain verbally. By means of these verbalizations, they aim at expressing,
describing, qualifying their pain experience.” Pain includes an internal experiential state
of pain and an external accompaniment of the experience, both verbal and non-verbal.
C. Lascaratou [2007: 25] asserts the double role of verbal manifestations of pain:
[…] by providing descriptive accounts, they may inform others and, for the sufferer,
they are representations reflecting his own experience, i.e. expressions rather than
descriptions.  Thus,  a  description  is  other-oriented  and informative,  whereas  an
expression is self-oriented.
4 The conceptualizer opts for irreal states or events to express his or her pain, which he or
she  does  not  describe.  The irreal  is  located  outside  the  immediate  reality  of  the
conceptualizer. For Langacker [1991], the irreal can either be unknown reality, or, that part
of reality which is not accepted or conceptualized as being factual. The irreal can only be
verbal whereas the real has an existence of its own, outside verbal representation. As
R. Langacker [1991: 243] explains:
A situation does not belong to reality or irreality on the basis of how the world has
actually evolved, but depends instead on whether the conceptualizer knows and
accepts it as being part of that evolutionary sequence.
5 With feel like and feel as if, the conceptualizer uses what he or she does not construe as
factual, what belongs to his or her conceptual irreal, to express his or her pain. The real,
by contrast, has to do with the certitude a speaker has about a state, an event. Mental
pain is expressed by approximation, by drawing comparisons with what it is not, with
what is not recognized or accepted as real.
6 The initial hypothesis is that there is no direct linguistic expression of mental pain – and
more generally of emotional experience or state. The central question can be phrased as
follows: what is the role of the irreal in the intermediary step of conceptualization? This
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broad question will be narrowed down to: 1. The analysis of the construction feel like and
feel as if; 2. The conceptual role of the external notions mental pain is associated with.
This  corpus-based  study  relies  on  autobiographical  sub-genres  (an  autobiographical
novel, auto-fiction, and a journal): Faces in the Water and An Autobiography by Janet Frame,
Shoot the Damn Dog by Sally Brampton, The Journals of Sylvia Plath, and Darkness Invisible: A
Memoir of Madness by William Styron. Additional contextualized excerpts from the BNC3
are added.
 
1. Feel like, feel as if
7 The constructional polysemy of the lexical verb feel is studied in C. Paulin [2003]. The
present study addresses the emotion schema representing the emotional state human
beings experience when they are in (mental)  pain,  defined as  a  complex experience,
subjective and difficult to quantify. Pain-related terms or expressions are often figurative:
language describes experiences of (physical and mental) pain, but it does not name them.
There is no literal expression of pain. Whether mental pain is less prototypical – in the
sense of E. Rosch [1978] – than physical pain in the way the notional domain of pain is
apprehended is not relevant for the analysis. The interest lies in the fact that language
helps  constitute  emotions,  as  shown  by  M. Gendron,  K. A. Lindquist,  L. Barsalou  &
L. F. Barrett [2012] who, in an experimental psychology approach, develop the idea that
words shape perception in a variety of domains and that emotion words act as a context
during  emotion perception:  “One  possibility  is  that  language  is  just  another  type  of
context to add to the list—an internal context in the mind of the perceiver.” Findings
from  cognitive  psychology  show  language  does  not  only  help  us  communicate  our
emotional perceptions and experiences, it also helps us constitute them. The idea that
language shapes  our  thoughts  and experiences  goes  back to  the Linguistic  Relativity
Hypothesis developed by Whorf. It has long been accepted that sensory and conceptual
information  play  a  role  in  building  up  conscious  experience.  In  this  paper,  it  is
hypothesized that expressions of  the irreal guide or even constitute subtle emotional
states or experiences such as mental pain. In other words, feeling mental pain does not
only get put into words. Verbal expressions get put into feelings. The constructions I feel
like or I feel as if include an experiencer that coalesces with the grammatical subject and
constitutes the theme of the utterance. The cause of the pain is not expressed and may
not even be conscious. The construction focuses on the experiencer, the emotional state
or experience for what it is not. Hence the idea that the verbal comparison in like or as if
constitutes the emotion. In N. Gisborne’s classification of perception verbs [2010: 4-8], feel
is in such cases considered as an experiencer verb: feel captures the subject’s cognitive
ability  to  experience  pain.  The  way  mental  pain  is  conceptualized  depends  on  the
comparison variants. 
 
1.1. Feel like + NP or propositional content
8 R. Huddleston & G. Pullum [2002: 1154] explain that with an NP complement, “like rather
than as is used in non-scalar term comparisons of equality”. In (2) to (5), the like + NP
phrase functions as predicative complement. In order to represent the mental pain that
the I endures, a comparison is drawn between the experiencer, the primary term, and
negatively connoted entities:  a hole in the ground, a heel  of  the worst sort,  a maggot in a
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carcass, hell. The non-scalar comparison established by feel like NP allows metaphorical
reasoning. Mapping a hole, a heel (in the sense of a contemptible untrustworthy person),
or  hell onto  the  I  enables  the  conceptualizer  to  create  a  third  space: mental  pain,
conceptualized as a negative entity. The experiencer is assimilated to the pain he feels. In
(2) to (4), like is complemented by [A NP PP]. The whole sequence forms a single NP which
is discursively produced to represent mental pain figuratively.
(2) I felt like a hole in the ground. (S. Plath [1971: 16])
(3) I felt like a heel of the worst sort. (S. Plath [1971: 5])
(4) ‘If this old body has anything to try with,’ Frank gasped. ‘Do you know
what I feel like? I feel like a maggot in a carcass.  I  know I’m alive. But
everything around me is dead.’ ‘The body is tougher than you think,’ Sister
Cooney said. ‘It needs driving, that’s all. It’s a sophisticated kind of machine
and, like a machine, you can’t afford to let it get rusty or it’ll seize up.’ (BNC)
9 In (5), the construction allows the suffering I to be represented as hell. A construction in
which  hell would  be  used  as  a  locative  as  in  (5’)  would  not  allow the  metaphorical
mapping. In (5’), the that-content clause functions as direct object of the verb feel, which
then expresses cognition rather than perception, sensation, or emotion. Feel like hell is a
fixed expression in which mental suffering is conventionally conceptualized as hell, as in
(6) in indirect discourse.
(5) I felt like hell. (S. Plath [1971: 43])
(5’) I felt (that) I was in hell.
(6) I also hate people to ask cheerfully how you are when they know you’re
feeling like hell and expect you to say “Fine”. (S. Plath [1971: 177])
10 In (7) to (10), the complex NP with its expansion [A NP (PP) relative clause] is relevant to
the  comparison  and  the  inner  conceptualization  the  experiencer  makes  of  mental
distress. In (8), you stands for all the I’s in mental homes who share a common experience.
The core NP refers to a human being (a child, a guest, an angler) whose condition is made
precise  in  the  relative  clause.  Unlike  the  I  in  (2)  to  (4),  the  I in  (7)  to  (10)  is  not
dehumanized. 
(7) I feel like a child who has been forced to eat a strange food in a strange
house  and  who  must  spend  the  night  there  in  a  strange  room  with  a
different smell in the bedclothes and different borders on the blankets, and
waken in the morning to the sight of a different and terrifying landscape
from the window. (J. Frame [2009: 14])
(8)  You  felt  like a  child  at  an  orphanage who has  been  accepted  for
adoption and must face, when your new parents call  for you, the longing
gaze of the deprived people around you. (J. Frame [2009: 45])
(9) But I felt increasingly like a guest who is given every hospitality in a
country  mansion  yet  who  finds  in  unexpected  moments  a  trace  of  a
mysterious  presence;  sliding  panels;  and  at  last  surprises  the  host  and
hostess in clandestine conversations and plottings with mention of poison,
torture, death. (J. Frame [2009: 64])
(10) One felt like an angler who discerns the ripple of a rainbow fish which
will surely die if it stays in the foul water. (J. Frame [2009: 147])
11 In (11) to (13), like is used with a content clause. Its complement is a complete finite
clause, and, in R. Huddleston & G. Pullum’s words [2002: 1158], “it is in competition with
as  if  / though.”  (11’)  shows that  the manipulation with as  if functions.  The difference
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between (11) and (11’) is acknowledged in terms of language variety and register by the
authors. A difference in terms of conceptualization can be added: like being primarily
used as a preposition, followed by an NP, its complement is more static, more objectified
than the content as if clause. In (11’’), the manipulation with as though is not satisfactory
given  that  the  enunciator  wishes  to  create  an  irreal third  space,  an  irreal prison  to
represent the experiential state of mental pain in which she is trapped. The conjunction
though would  indicate  that  the  irreal representation  of  mental  pain  as  a  form  of
imprisonment  does  not  really  apply,  or  does  not  correspond  with  the  way  the
conceptualizer wishes to represent it. In (13), prepositional like could be used as in (13’).
The representation of mental pain goes from the more irreal/hypothetical in I feel as if I
was a guinea pig to the complete superimposition of a guinea pig onto the I in I was a guinea
pig. Prepositional like “with an NP as complement is used in non-scalar term comparisons
of  equality”  (R. Huddleston  &  G. Pullum [2002: 1154]).  In  (13’)  the  I establishes  a
comparison of equality between herself and a guinea pig. She knows that she is not a
guinea pig and yet she conceptualizes herself as such. In (13), like is used as a connector
which  may  signal  the  informal  style  of  the  utterance.  The  comparison  is  no  longer
established between two entities – I and a guinea pig – but between the I and “being what
the I is (not)”. Given that I wasn’t a guinea pig, the irreal dimension of the comparison is
reinforced. The manipulation in (13’’) is very similar to (13).
(11) ‘I feel like I’m in prison and I don’t understand the crime,’ she told him
once the preliminaries were over.
‘Wow! That sounds really heavy.’
‘Yeah. It feels really heavy as a matter of fact.’ (BNC) 
(11’) I feel as if I’m / was / were in prison…
(11’’) ? I feel as though I’m / was / were in prison…
(12) I felt like I was learning to walk again. (S. Brampton [2008: 4])
(13)  I  felt  like I  was  a  guinea  pig,  not  a  human  being.  (S. Brampton
[2008: 213])
(13’) I felt like a guinea pig, not a human being.
(13’’) I felt as if I was a guinea pig. 
12 This analysis focuses on feel as an experiencer verb, I being the subject. However, it must
be noted that feel like may be used with a subject that has a different semantic role:
(14) To me it felt like the total disintegration of everything I had ever known
about myself. (S. Brampton [2008: 42])
13 It is anaphorical of mental pain or depression and it is thematized. The experiencer me is
tropicalized by fronting but is presented as a witness of a change caused by depression. A
comparable representation occurs in (15): depression is the cause of [I / feel like an invalid].
The I experiencer, in object function, is acted upon by mental pain:
(15) It makes me feel like an invalid. (S. Brampton [2008: 88])
 
1.2. Feel as if + propositional content
14 As if connects a real experience of mental pain or depression to a hypothetical one: the
subject’s experience of pain is compared to an irreal situation which causes him or her an
emotion similar to that caused by mental pain. In (16) and (17), the as if clause functions
as predicative complement. The subject in the matrix and in the predicative complement
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coalesce in (16) whereas there is a metonymic relationship between I and my mind in (17).
In (16) I feel… as if the room’s closing on me, the subject of the matrix and that of the as if
clause are distinct. In all these occurrences, the idea of comparison encoded by as if is not
salient.  It  is more a question of shifting from comparison to evaluating how real the
content of the as if clause is or feels like for the I. As if could be replaced by that as in (16’)
and (17’). The verb feel with a that-content clause as its direct object would then acquire a
cognitive meaning, as is the case in (5’). As if, unlike that, reinforces the modal meaning,
the irreal contained by the utterance (R. Huddleston & G. Pullum [2002: 1151]):
(16) ‘It’s not as rational as that. I’m scared but I don’t know what of. I feel as
if I’m drowning, or as if the room’s closing in on me. I feel as if I’ll die if
I stay where I am but I’m scared to get up and go somewhere else. It’s awful, I
can’t explain it. (BNC)
(16’) [...] I feel that I’m drowning, or that the room’s closing on me. I feel that
I’ll die.
(17) After he calmed down, Scott reasoned that if  Annabel were having a
heart attack, she wouldn’t be able to talk on the telephone. Cautiously he
said, ‘Why do you think that, angel?’
‘My heart is thumping! I can’t breathe properly – I’m gasping for air!’ 
‘It might be another anxiety attack,’ Scott suggested gently. 
Annabel said in an agitated voice, ‘I feel as if my mind is whirling madly,
like a hurricane. I can’t control it. I feel taut and tense. I’m literally shaking!’ (
BNC)
(17’) [...] ‘I feel that my mind is whirling madly, like a hurricane.
15 In (18) and (19), feel is used in the matrix in the past tense, V-ED, and so is the verb in the
as if clause, due to tense cohesion in a past narrative. The modal value of -ED cannot be
totally discarded, but it certainly does not prevail. 
(18) I felt as if I lost my balance (S. Brampton [2008: 42])
(19)  I  felt,  that  year,  as  if my  heart  broke  over  and  over again.
(S. Brampton [2008: 178])
16 In (20), the instanciation of WILL + -ED reinforces the epistemic modality, in the sense
that the predicative relationships the world / sweep over and engulf are presented as irreal 
projections in the future as is shown in the manipulation in (20’):
(20)  After being  and  feeling  a  nothing  and  nobody,  and  forced  into  a
continued state of physical and emotional submission, I felt as if the world
would sweep over and engulf me,  while I  would meekly accept and act
upon suggestions and orders from others, out of the habitual fear that had
grown within me, in hospital. (J. Frame [1994: 224])
(20’) [...] I feel as if the world will sweep over and engulf me…
17 In (21), the irreal dimension is primarily presented in an as if clause. In the utterance that
follows, the conceptualizer comments upon it in an as though clause. With though,  the
main difference lies in that the content of the clause is not only presented as irreal but it
is also suggested that it goes against what is likely to be. The clause entails that there is life
ouside this one that I have found there:
(21) I feel as if I am poised somewhere on the edge of a slope, and about to
slide down when I am supposed to be climbing up. It’s crazy, but I feel as
though I have no life outside this one I have found here, complete with silly
old colonials and Masai witch-doctor. (BNC)
The language of mental pain: feel like, feel as if
Lexis, 13 | 2019
6
18 In the examples that follow, the construction differs and the comparison is no longer
between the experiencer’s feelings and a hypothetical situation but rather between two
distinct situations or at least two distinct predications. In (22), S/P 1 I / feel myself dropping
is compared to an external situation a trap door / open into darkness which is anterior to S/
P 1. As if + HAD V-EN allows the I narrator to represent a present experience in terms of a
past hypothetical one:
(22) … and I feel myself dropping as if a trap door had opened into darkness.
(J. Frame [2009: 18])
19 In (23), the experiencer undergoes a feeling of remoteness from the arrangements made
for her by her family and her doctor. It is compared to a hypothetical situation, in which
the subject is dead, her house is invaded and her belongings are stolen. The implication is
that the mentally ill patient is deprived of her own life and that other people, in charge of
her, are deciding for her life as if she were dead:
(23) I  felt remote from the arrangements being made for me; as if I  were
lying on my death-bed watching the invasion of my house and the disposal of
my treasures and glimpsing though the half-open door into the adjoining
room the waiting coffin – my final burrow milk-white web nest between two
rocks. (J. Frame [2009: 191-192])
20 In  (24),  the  experiencer’s  numbness,  enervation and  fragility,  are  compared  to  a
hypothetical  situation  in  which  the  subject’s  body  is  actually  disjoint  and  lacking
coordination. The use of the as if clause enables metaphorical reasoning. The I constructs
a hypothetical situation which makes his experience more accessible to the addressee.
(24) I felt a kind of numbness, an enervation, but more particularly an odd
fragility,  as  if my  body  had  actually  become  frail,  hypersensitive  and
somehow  disjointed  and  clumsy,  lacking  normal  coordination.  (W. Styron
[1990: 43])
21 The gerund clause in (22)  myself  dropping and the complex NP a kind of  numbness,  an
enervation, but more particularly an odd fragility in (24) function as direct objects of feel. The
as if clause does not have a predicative function as it is the case in the previous examples.
The predication is oriented towards the object in an SVO construction. The manipulation
with like is not receivable given that the adverbial clause in as if is in a relationship of
dependency  with  the  main  predication  I / feel  myself  dropping  and  I / feel  a  kind  of
numbness, an enervation, but more particularly an odd fragility, and not with the noun phrase
which precedes it:
(22’)  * …  and  I  feel  myself  dropping  like  a  trap  door  had  opened  into
darkness.
(24’) * I felt a kind of numbness, an enervation, but more particularly an odd
fragility,  like my  body  had  actually  become  frail,  hypersensitive  and
somehow disjointed and clumsy, lacking normal coordination.
22 In  (23)  feel is  followed  by  a  predicative  adjectival  phrase  and,  here  again,  the
manipulation with like is not receivable:
(23’) * I felt remote from the arrangements being made for me; like I were
lying on my death-bed watching the invasion of my house and the disposal of
my treasures…
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23 With the irreal construction in like or as if, the experience of the I is not denoted in its
globality. It is referred to in terms of what it is not. In addition, the comparison allows to
highlight  a  particular  dimension  which  is  made  salient  for  both  participants,  the
experiencer and the addressee.
 
2. The irreal: figurative language, conceptual
knowledge and the representation of mental pain
24 The notion of irreal is not used as an antonym of real. The irreal is not the non-real. Non-
reality concerns what has not occurred and is recognized as such. The irreal allows the
experiencer to represent and conceptualize his or her feelings, in an alternative way,
which is not counterfactual. The elements of comparison are iconic of the mental pain
feelings.  The conceptualizer places his  or her mental  pain feelings outside conceived
reality, in a region which is the irreal. The grounded mental pain feelings belong to the
conceptualizer’s inner reality, which is foregrounded thanks to figurative elements. [Like
 + complement]  and [as  if + clause]  place  mental  pain feelings  in  a  figurative  irreality,
which  correlates  the  actual  feelings  of  mental  pain  and  their  representations.  The
elements of comparison are based on the conceptualizer’s mental constructions of what
he or she feels.  Expressions such as those used in (1) to (24) evoke a mental picture
representing  the  actual  feelings  of  the  experiencer.  They  presuppose  a  mental
construction describing the inherent nature of mental pain. The need for a schematic
characterization  of  mental  pain  is  answered  thanks  to  the  lexical  verb  feel  and  the
figurative complements it governs. The complementation in like or as if in (1) to (21) does
not introduce elements that are counter to the actual feeling. They indicate that mental
pain can only be described by approximation, in terms of what it is not. The comparison
or the comparative hypothetical  situation introduced by as if  turn out to be ways to
conceptualize real pain by externalizing it from the real. In a note, R. Langacker [2008: 29]
explains  that  “the  ‘world’  includes  both  the  real  world  and  the  mental  worlds  we
construct, as well as the body and even our mental experience itself (to the extent that we
can reflect on it, as opposed to merely undergoing it).” Feelings of mental pain are at the
very core of the experiencer-cognizer’s reality. To communicate about them, he or she
situates them in a reality which is not fully established. R. Langacker [1991: 243] develops
what he considers as unknown reality: “Observe that unknown reality is part of irreality of
which the remainder constitutes non-reality.”
25 The impossibility to express mental pain other than by comparing it with what it is not
grants it an irreal dimension. Nevertheless, the verbalization of mental pain enables the
experiencer-cognizer to give it a cognitive reality by representing it with words, images,
situations. In that respect, linguistic expressions generate the irreal, potentially viewed as
real. What is real or irreal depends on one’s positioning towards a state of affairs, past,
present or future. In the examples presented in this paper, mental pain is conceptualized
in different ways: it may be figuratively represented as an entity, an agonistic force, or it
may be conceived as a particular state, an emotional state or an event. Emotions and
feelings can be represented either as states or events: X is in pain (state), X undergoes Y
(e.g. X is sent into a frenzy), Y acts upon X (e.g. My depression drove me to commit suicide, pain
ruled over me…). Mental pain is represented as a trap, a hole, hell, prison…; the detrimental
experiencer as an invalid, an orphan, not a human being… A. Wierzbicka [1995], Z. Kövecses
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[1990, 2003] among others explain that “emotion terms have a great deal of conceptual
content and structure” (Z. Kövecses [2003: 7]). R. Langacker [2008: 32] develops the idea
that conceptual structure is both “propositional in nature” and that it has “an imagistic
character”. The conceptual structure of mental pain is constructed by the “vocabulary”,
the lexical verb feel in particular, by analogy with other entities and by the syntactic
combination of the verb and its complementation. The co-constructional polysemy of feel 
makes it a good candidate to represent the complexity of the perceptual and emotional
experience of mental pain in its multidimensionality. The expression of mental pain is
primarily  that  of  a  single  experiencer.  However,  verbal  expression  requires  to  take
intersubjectivity into account. The individual expression of pain is such that it develops
through  and  for  communicative  intentions.  It  includes  a  certain  degree  of
conventionality, at the conceptual and the communicative levels.
26 Expressing one’s feelings and emotions, and more specifically mental pain, relies on the
verbal reconstruction of the quasi inexpressible. Mental pain can be conceptualized as a
subtle emotional state (feel like + noun phrase) or as an emotional event (feel like / as if
 + propositional content). The conceptualization of mental pain encompasses novel and
established representations. It is sensory and emotive, apprehended in context, personal
and  cultural.  C. Lacassain-Lagoin  [2012: 64],  following  Wittgenstein’s  approach,  shows
that both proposition and perception co-construct a model of reality in which truth and
falsity co-exist and are, in all aspects, comparable. Mental pain exists and yet what is
referred  to  linguistically  “is  often  a  virtual (or  fictive)  instance,  i.e.  an  imaginary
instance ‘conjured up’ for some purpose.” (R. Langacker [2008: 36]) Mental pain can be
seen as a perceptive and emotional experience. The perception of the subject by himself
or  herself,  the  interpretation of  reality  by  the  subject  and the  interpretation of  the
language of mental pain both by the subject and the reader are intertwined in discourse
about  mental  pain.  By  reporting  mental  pain  (emotional  states  or  events),  the
conceptualizer evokes feelings in the reader. Writing about one’s mental pain serves the
expressive function of language but not exclusively. Implicit communicative interaction,
interpretative and cognitive dimensions are also at play: by expressing one’s pain and
communicating  about  it,  the  experiencer  may  gain  a  better  understanding  of  it.
Verbalizing mental pain is a volitional act and as such it may enable the experiencer to
act upon himself or herself and his or her feelings.
 
Conclusion
27 As stated by K. Linquist, A. Satpute, Ajay & M. Gendron [2015], “language helps constitute
emotion perception”. It has a constitutive role in perceiving mental pain as what it is not,
as what it feels like. With constructions such as feel like, feel as if, conceptual knowledge is
used to represent and, to some extent, to make sense of mental pain. Mental pain occurs
in contexts when the self is threatened, fragmented, humiliated. Pain is felt within, it
comes from within or from an external stimulus. The sensation experienced inside one’s
body is conceptualized and shared through language. The difficulty lies in this: once it is
put into words, mental pain is no longer what it is: it is represented in terms of what it is
not. However, the irreal dimension of its representation grants it an existence for the
outside world and a form of objectivization for the self. Putting mental pain into words
forces the experiencer to externalize it, to some extent. Verbal expression constructs the
emotion, the feeling, through elements of comparison, and, in return, words modulate
The language of mental pain: feel like, feel as if
Lexis, 13 | 2019
9
them. The irreal, the elements of comparison, come to the rescue of the conceptualization
of what is most real: inner mental pain. In that respect, figurative language, which is
central for human conceptualization, (re)creates the emotional reality of mental pain. In
addition,  putting  words  on  the  pain  which  is  felt  may  reduce  the  intensity  of  the
emotional experience. The act of using language to represent feelings and emotions of
mental  pain  may  detach  the  subject  from  the  impact  of  the  experience  and,  as  a
consequence,  may  reduce  the  intensity  of  the  emotional  experience.  To  establish
intersubjective  communication,  a  certain  degree  of  conventionality  needs  to  be
maintained.  Furthermore,  emotional  intersubjectivity,  sharing  or  writing  about  one
experience of mental pain, enables the subject to transform his or her private experience
into a common experience. 
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NOTES
1. I owe some of the examples quoted in this paper to a former M2 student, Elina Aristodemou.
Many thanks to her.
2. C for cognizer.
3. The BNC excerpts are taken from contemporary autobiographical discourse genres.
ABSTRACTS
In this article, I am interested in the relationship between the experience of mental pain, the
sensations  and  emotions  it  engenders  and  its  verbal  representations  in  autobiographical
writings. I have attempted to provide an account of the verbalization of mental pain by analyzing
the constructions feel like + NP, feel like / as if + propositional content. These constructions enable
the subject to represent his or her experience in terms of an irreal experience and, by mobilizing
a comparison, to highlight an important aspect of mental pain.
Cet article analyse les relations entre l’expérience de la douleur mentale, les sensations et les
émotions  qu’elle  entraîne  et  les  représentations  qui  en  sont  faites  dans  des  écrits
autobiographiques. L’étude du verbe lexical feel dans les constructions feel like + SN, feel like / as if
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+ contenu propositionnel permet de montrer que la douleur mentale est conceptualisée comme
ce qu’elle n’est pas, dans l’irréel. En mobilisant un élément de comparaison, l’énonciateur rend
saillant un aspect important de la douleur mentale.
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